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Giulia Quaggio
Social Movements and Participatory Democracy
Spanish Protests for Peace during the Last Decade of the Cold War 
(19811986)*
On the morning of 15 November 1981, over 200,000 Spanish citizens marched from Ave-
nida Complutense to Ciudad Universitaria in Madrid. It was a human wave chanting for 
peace, disarmament, freedom, but above all, against Spains entry into the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). On the wide esplanade in the university district, people of 
all ages, many of them with children, waved white handkerchiefs. As they marched, they 
listened to Ana Belén singing »La Muralla« (The Wall), a 1969 Chilean anti-war ballad, 
suppressed by Augusto Pinochets dictatorship, which stressed the need to break down so-
cial and psychological barriers to make way for a different world.1
Elsewhere in Europe, similar grassroots protests, calling for peace and an end to the 
arms race, were taking place. On 10 October, a month before the Madrid demonstration, 
about 250,000 people gathered in Bonn; 210,000 just two weeks later in Brussels; 410,000 
on 21 November in Amsterdam; and about 200,000 each in Rome and Athens.2 During the 
Madrid demonstration, some activists symbolically wrapped themselves in bandages, pre-
tending to be victims of a hypothetical Third World War. In Spain, as in other European FRXQWULHVWKHSHUFHLYHGWKUHDWRIDQLPPLQHQWJOREDOFRQÁLFWZDVZLGHVSUHDGGXHWRWKH
worsening of relations between the two superpowers triggered by NATOs Double-Track 
Decision of 1979 to install Cruise Missiles and Pershing II intermediate range missiles in 
Europe. This fuelled the mobilisation of a heterogeneous movement for peace that lasted 
until 1986.3
* This article was written in the context of the project »Protest as Democratic Practice: Peace Move-
ments in Southern Europe, 19751990«, generously funded by the Max Batley legacy to the Uni-YHUVLW\RI6KHIÀHOG,ZRXOGOLNHWRH[SUHVVP\JUDWLWXGHWR%HQMDPLQ=LHPDQQ(LULQL.DUDPRX]L
and Maria Grasso for their advice, valuable suggestions, and continuous support.
1 The Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén was the author of this song. Cf. Fernando González Lucini,  Veinte 
años de canción en España (19631983). Los problemas sociales y la solidaridad, Madrid 1986. 7KHSUHFLVHQXPEHURIGHPRQVWUDWRUVLVQRWFOHDUGXHWRFRQÁLFWLQJVRXUFHV7KHUHDUHGRXEWVFRQFHUQLQJWKHRIÀFLDOÀJXUHVIRUWKHQXPEHURIGHPRQVWUDWRUVLQWKHÀUVWPDMRU6SDQLVKSHDFHSUR-
test of the so-called Second Cold War. The newspaper »Diario 16« numbered protesters at 300,000; 
»El País« reported 250,000 protesters; the Civil Governorship, in contrast, put the number at just 
75,000. According to the research project »European Protest and Coercion Data« by Ron Fran-FLVFR RI WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI .DQVDV WKHUH ZHUH  GHPRQVWUDWRUV LQ 0DGULG &I Eckart 
Conze / Martin Klimke / Jeremy Varon, Introduction: Between Accidental Armageddons and Win-
nable Wars: Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Fears in the 1980s, in: id. (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nu-
clear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s, New York 2016, pp. 123, here: p. 5.
3 On the complex process through which the Double-Track Decision was taken, see: Kristina Spohr 
Readman&RQÁLFWDQG&RRSHUDWLRQLQ,QWUD$OOLDQFH1XFOHDU3ROLWLFV:HVWHUQ(XURSHWKH8QLW-
ed States, and the Genesis of NATOs Dual-Track Decision, 19771979, in: Journal of Cold War 
Studies 13, 2011, no. 2, pp. 3989, here: pp. 4143. John Young, Western Europe and the End of 
the Cold War, 19791989, in: 0HOY\Q3/HIÁHU2GG$UQH:HVWDG (eds.), The Cambridge Histo-
ry of the Cold War, vol. 3: Endings, Cambridge 2010, pp. 289310. Leopoldo Nuti / Frédéric 
Bozo / Marie-Pierre Rey et al., The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Stanford 
2015.
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During this period, the concept of nuclear warfare was undergoing a radical change. In 
NATOs new military strategy, the use of nuclear missiles was no longer an absolute »evil« 
to be avoided at all costs but was seen  in a »limited« form  as a real possibility and even DQHFHVVLW\LQRUGHUWRZLQDSRVVLEOHFRQÁLFWLQWKH(XURSHDQWKHDWUH:KLOHWKHZDYHRI
protests for peace in Spain was part and parcel of the pan-European cycle of transnation-
al mobilisation against nuclear proliferation, its trajectory differed from other European SHDFHPRYHPHQWVDQGGLVSOD\HGQDWLRQDOVSHFLÀFLWLHV4 Spain was not one of the countries 
that had been chosen for the deployment of the »Euromissiles«. Thus, protests for peace 
acquired a pronounced anti-NATO and anti-American character in the aftermath of the fall 
of one of the longest periods of dictatorship in a European country.5
This article aims to analyse two major aspects of the Spanish anti-NATO groups and the 
ways in which they framed their protests during the 1980s.6 First, it helps to understand 
how the peace movement verbally formulated an ideal notion of democracy and what this 
framing entailed for Spanish society shortly after a tangled process of democratisation. 
Second, it explores the experimentation of Spanish grassroots groups with notions of par-
ticipatory and direct democracy that included a form of self-government in which citizens 
would participate in shaping collective decisions in an environment of equality and delib-
eration7 during the period of consolidation of the countrys new democratic institutions.8 
The democratising practices implemented by these movements are the main topic of this 
study. Spanish mass demonstrations for peace became an experience of practising democ-
racy in a country where, despite serious democratisation efforts, social structures remained 
largely hierarchical and inequitable.9
In this article, the Spanish anti-NATO movement will be analysed with regard to the 
collective forums for debate and opinion sharing on nuclear proliferation, the relationship 
between power and democracy, and the values and practices of a direct democracy which 
were to implement representative deliberation in the newly formed parliamentary monar-
chy. To address these issues, documents from Spanish peace groups (mostly minutes of WKHLUPHHWLQJVDQGDQWL1$72SXEOLFDWLRQVGXULQJWKHÀUVWKDOIRIWKHVKDYHEHHQFRQVXOWHG,QDGGLWLRQOHDÁHWVDQGSHDFHDFWLYLVWV·SDPSKOHWVKDYHEHHQDQDO\VHGLQRUGHU
to chart the ways in which activists articulated notions of self-representation as democrat-
ic and methods for interacting with the new democratic institutions.10
 4 Benjamin Ziemann, A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War DQG7KHLU(OHFWLYH$IÀQLWLHVLQ$I6SS²
 5 Cf. /DZUHQFH6:LWWQHU, Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarma-
ment Movement. 1971 to the Present, Stanford 2003, pp. 163 f.
 6 On the processes of framing meanings within social movements: David A. Snow / Anna E. Tan / 3HWHU%2ZHQV, Social Movements, Framing Processes and Cultural Revitalization and Fabri-
cation, in: Mobilization. An International Quarterly 18, 2013, pp. 225242.
 7 On the concept of participatory democracy, see: Rod Hague / Martin Harrop, Comparative Gov-HUQPHQWDQG3ROLWLFV$Q,QWURGXFWLRQ%DVLQJVWRNH1HZ<RUNÀUVWSXEOLVKHGS
43. Laurence Bherer / Pascale Dufour / Françoise Montambeault, The Participatory Democracy 
Turn: An Introduction, in: Journal of Civil Society 12, 2016, pp. 225230.
 8 Cf. Andreas Schedler, What Is Democratic Consolidation?, in: Journal of Democracy 9, 1998, 
no. 2, pp. 91107.
 9 Álvaro Soto Carmona, La evolución de la sociedad en la transición y la democracia, in: Javier 
Tusell Gómez / José Luis García Delgado / Juan Carlos Jiménez et al., Historia de España Me-
néndez Pidal, vol. 42: La transición a la democracia y la España de Juan Carlos I, Madrid 2003, 
pp. 500557.
10 A good example on framing analysis in historiographical research on social movements: Luca 
Falciola, Il movimento del 1977 in Italia, Roma 2015.
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I. PEACE MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES
The spark that ignited protests for peace was the decision by the Spanish government, led 
by the Union of the Democratic Centre (»Unión de Centro Democrático«, UCD) to accel-
erate Spains entry into the Atlantic Alliance after the failed military coup in February 
1981.11 Although Spain did not become a member of NATO until May 1982, its geopoliti-
cal position during the Cold War meant that a special security and economic relationship 
had developed with the USA since 1953.12 A substantial section of the Spanish population 
perceived the US as the dominant military power, which had allowed the Franco dictator-VKLSWRÁRXULVKLQH[FKDQJHIRUIRXUDLUIRUFHDQGQDYDOEDVHV13 Consequently, strong anti- 
American sentiments resurfaced in connection with the enlargement of NATO.14 In the 
popular imagination, the US was equated with a foreign force that had limited the sover-
eignty of the Spanish on their own territory, diminished their decision-making capacity and 
contaminated their traditional culture.15
In the immediate aftermath of Francisco Francos death, the thorny issue of Spains en-
try into NATO was put to one side for fear of endangering the smooth running of the democ-
ratisation process. The new political institutions dealt with this question only after the 
promulgation of the democratic Spanish constitution and during the consolidation period 
of the parliamentary monarchy.16 It was Spains entry into NATO and, between 1982 and 
1986, the demand for a referendum to leave the Atlantic Alliance which became the main 
rallying point for many Spanish peace organisations. Only after the 1986 referendum on 
11 On Spains entry into NATO: Charles F. Powell, El amigo Americano. España y Estados Uni-
dos: de la dictadura a la democracia, Madrid 2011, pp. 494585; Ángel Linares, La adhesión de 
España en la OTAN: notas para una revisión crítica, in: Historia Actual Online, 2013, no. 32, 
pp. 2330; Javier Rupérez, España en la OTAN. Relato parcial, Barcelona 1986.
12 Lorenzo Delgado, ¿El »amigo americano«? España y Estados Unidos durante el Franquismo, 
in: Studia Histórica. Historia Contemporánea 21, 2003, pp. 231276, available at URL: <http://
revistas.usal.es/index.php/0213-2087/article/view/5952> [5.7.2018]. Fernando Termis Soto, Re-
nunciando a todo. El régimen franquista y los Estados Unidos desde 1945 hasta 1963, Madrid 
2005.
13 After the so-called Madrid agreements (1953), the USA quickly installed four large military struc-
tures: the air bases at Torrejón de Ardoz (1957), near Madrid, one at Morón in Seville, the air EDVHDW=DUDJR]DDQGWKHDLUVHDEDVHDW5RWDLQ&iGL]7KHUHDUHRQO\DIHZVWXGLHV
on American military bases in Spain. See: Rocío Piñeiro Álvarez, Guerra y medio ambiente: una 
historia de la base aeronaval de Rota (desde 1953 hasta la actualidad), PhD Thesis, Cádiz 2004. 
In general on American military bases: Alexander Cooley, Base Politics. Democratic Change 
and the U. S. Military Overseas, New York 2008.
14 On Spanish anti-Americanism: Antonio L. Golmar Gallego / Lourdes López Nieto, Anti-Ameri-
canism in Spain, 18082004: Facts and Opinions, Paper prepared for the Workshop on Anti- 
Americanism in Comparative Historical Perspective, European Consortium for Political Re-
search, Nicosia, April 2006. Francisco Javier Rodríguez / Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla / 
Nicholas J. Cull (eds.), US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain. Selling Democra-
cy?, London 2015.
15 Alessandro Seregni, El antiamericanismo español, Madrid 2007. Daniel Fernández de Miguel, 
La erosión del antiamericanismo conservador durante el franquismo, in: Ayer, 2009, no. 75, pp. 
193221.
16 The negotiations for the renewal of the bilateral agreements with the United States were  another 
issue that underpinned the whole democratisation process. In 1970, American base infrastruc-WXUHEHFDPHSURSHUW\RI6SDLQWRJHWKHUZLWKWKH5RWD=DUDJR]DRLOSLSHOLQHLQWKHVHDJUHH-
ments acquired the status of »treaty«; in 1982, when Spain was already in NATO, the Friend-
ship, Defence and Cooperation Agreement was signed, then revised in 1988. Ángel Viñas, La 
negociación y renegociación de los acuerdos hispano-norteamericanos, 19531988: Una visión 
estructural, in: Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea 25, 2003, pp. 83108.
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NATO membership and the victory of the remain vote17 did these organisations start to lose 
their momentum and popularity.
As in other European countries, this movement grew within in a predominantly left-wing 
cultural milieu. It generated a complex network of relations between the Communist  Party 
of Spain (»Partido Comunista de España«, PCE)18; the radical extra-parliamentary leftist 
parties, in particular, the Maoist Communist Movement (»Movimiento Comunista«, MC); 
the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League (»Liga Comunista Revolucionaria«, LCR)19; 
as well as with the Catholic workers groups  the Catholic Worker Brotherhood (»Her-
mandad Obrera de Acción Católica«, HOAC) and the Christian Worker Youth (»Juventud 
Obrera Cristiana«, JOC).20 The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (»Partido Socialista Obre-
ro Español«, PSOE) also supported the protests for peace initially, generating high hopes 
among its activists with its victory in the 1982 elections. The PSOE, however, would soon 
adopt a pro-NATO stance, making itself a target for anti-NATO demonstrations.21
It is possible to identify two major umbrella organisations that coordinated the activism 
of peace groups in Spain. Since 1983, the National Coordinating Organization of the Span-LVK3HDFH*URXSVª&RRUGLQDGRUD(VWDWDOGH2UJDQL]DFLRQHV3DFLÀVWDV©&(23KDGXQLW-
ed anti-NATO grassroots groups, environmentalists, conscientious objectors, feminists 
and the extra-parliamentary left. By contrast, the pro-Communist Commission for Peace 
and Disarmament in Madrid (»Comisión de Acción por la Paz y el Desarme«, CAPD) had 
emerged from the social base of the parliamentary left that, in 1984, proposed the Mesa 
pro referendum (Table for the Referendum): an organisation calling for a referendum in 
order to decide collectively Spains position regarding NATO.22 This group mainly brought WRJHWKHUWKHSHDFHJURXSVRIWKH3&(DOWKRXJKSDFLÀVWVRFLDOLVWV&DWKROLFRUJDQLVDWLRQV
and UCD activists who were sceptical of military cooperation with the USA joined  forces 
17 Spains NATO referendum has received surprisingly little scholarly attention: Consuelo Val Cid, 
Opinión publica y opinión publicada. Los españoles y el referéndum de la OTAN, Madrid 1996. %HDWD:RMQD, Spains and Polands Road to NATO: The Problem of Continuity and Change in 
the Foreign Policy of a Democratising State, in: European Review of History 15, 2008, pp. 533
547.
18 On the relation between the PCE and peace groups, cf. Emanuele Treglia, La última batalla de 
la transición, la primera de la democracia. La oposición a la OTAN y las transformaciones del 
PCE (19811986), in: Ayer, 2016, no. 103, pp. 7196.
19 On the Spanish radical left and peace groups, cf. Pablo Socorro Arencibia, El papel de la iz-
quierda revolucionaria en la vertebración del movimiento anti-OTAN en el Estado español, in: 
Historia del Presente, 2017, no. 29, pp. 137150. On the history of Spanish radical left during 
the transition: Consuelo Laíz/DOXFKDÀQDO/RVSDUWLGRVGHL]TXLHUGDUDGLFDOGXUDQWHODWUDQ-
sición española, Madrid 1995.
20 On the history of these Catholic workers groups: Basilisa López García, Aproximación a la his-
toria de la HOAC. 19461981, Madrid 1995; Florentino Sanz Fernández, La Juventud Obrera 
Cristiana: un movimiento educativo popular, in: Historia de la Educación 20, 2001, pp. 95115.
21 &DUORVÉQJHO2UGiV, OTAN de entrada No. El PSOE y el uso político de la integración españo-
la en el Pacto Atlántico o cómo hacer de la necesidad virtud, 19801986, in: Carlos Navajas 
Zubeldía / Diego Iturriaga Barco (eds.), España en democracia. Actas del IV Congreso Interna-
cional de la Historia de Nuestro Tiempo, Logroño 2014, pp. 293305. Paul Kennedy, The Span-
ish Socialist Party and the Modernisation of Spain, Manchester 2013.
22 This organisation was mainly comprised by leaders and militants of the Spanish and Catalan 
Communist Party, Workers Commission (»Comisiones Obreras«, CCOO), Republican Left of 
Catalonia (»Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya«, ERC), Basque Country Left (»Euskadiko Es-
querra«, EE), the Andalusian Party (»Partido Andalucista«, PA), Democratic and Social Centre 
(»Centro Democrático y Social«, CDS), Socialist Action Party (»Partido de Acción Socialista«, 
PASOC), and other nationalist parties (i. e. »Izquierda Nacionalista Canaria«).
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on some occasions.231HYHUWKHOHVVLWLVGLIÀFXOWWRPHDVXUHWKHVSHFLÀFZHLJKWRIHDFK
group within the Spanish peace demonstrations.24 In most cases, different groups protest-
ed together.25 Ronald Reagans visit to Madrid in 1985 was met by over 400,000 demon-
strators of all ages and social groups.261HYHUWKHOHVVWKHSHUVLVWHQFHRIDQXQUHVROYHGFODVVFRQÁLFWZKLFKZDVWKHUHVXOWRIWKH
ambiguous economic modernisation during the dictatorship, contributed to radicalising 
Spanish anti-NATO protest groups, which also took up workers causes.27 The economy 
and unemployment were other major issues taken up by every Spanish anti-war group.28 
For instance, according to the declarations of the CEOP in 1984:
»Remaining in NATO causes instability because it creates enemies. It forces us to take part in con-ÁLFWVEHWZHHQPLOLWDU\EORFV,WVWUHQJWKHQVWKHEORFNDGHSROLFLHVDQGLWWXUQVXVLQWRDWDUJHWRIQX-
clear attack. In addition, military expenditure is increasing and the creation of new jobs is being hin-
dered«.29
The growth of the Spanish peace movement should be analysed in the context of what has EHHQFDOOHGªVRFLRORJLFDOSDFLÀVP©IROORZLQJ)UDQFR·VGLFWDWRUVKLS30 This term is used 
to describe a generic disdain for war and the military, brought about by the trauma of the 
Civil War and the direct support of Francoism by the armed forces. Moreover, Spanish 
peace groups displayed a fervent desire to overcome what they considered a limited democ-
ratisation process and the persistence of a Francoist idea of peace.31
In 1975, Spain reverted to democracy after more than forty years of dictatorship, and 
its people had to learn democracy through direct experience and through the new reali-W\RIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQV+RZHYHUWKHGHPRFUDF\RIWKHÀQDOGHFDGHVRIWKH
twentieth century was not comparable to that of the beginning of the century, and neither 
was the democracy promoted and practised by the underground anti-Francoist opposition. 
23 Cf. Pablo Socorro Arencibia, La última batalla de la transición. Las organizaciones del movi-
miento anti-NATO, MA Thesis, Oviedo 2015, pp. 3547.
24 On the origins of the peace movement in Spain, cf. 3HGUR2OLYHU2OPR(OPRYLPLHQWRSDFLÀV-
ta en la transición democrática española, in: Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz (ed.), La so-
ciedad española en la Transición. Los movimientos sociales en el proceso democratizador,  Madrid 
2011, p. 271; Enric Prat Carvajal, Moviéndose por la paz. De Pax Christi a las movilizaciones 
contra la guerra, Barcelona 2007.
25 For instance, on the composition of the peace movement in Catalonia, see: Enric Prat, Activis-
tes de la pau: estudi sociològic i polític dels activistes del moviment per la pau de la dècada de 
1980, Barcelona 2008, p. 210.
26 Data included in the research project »European Protest and Coercion Data« by Ron Francisco 8QLYHUVLW\RI.DQVDV
27 Cf. the interpretative model in order to compare social movements in different countries in: +DQVSHWHU.ULHVL5XXG.RRSPDQV-DQ:LOOHP'X\YHQGDNet al., New Social Movements in 
Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis, London 1995.
28 Cf. .DWDULQD-XVHOLXV-DYLHU2UGyxH]0RQIRUW, Wage, Price and Unemployment Dynamics in 
the Spanish Transition to EMU Membership, Economics Discussion Paper No. 2008-20, avail-
able at URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1723639> [5.7.2018].
29 Report meeting CEOP, 1415 January 1984, p. 1, Communist Movement Archive, Federación $FFLyQHQ5HG0DGULG$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
30 Antonio Izquierdo/DFRQFLHQFLDSDFLÀVWDHVSDxRODXQDSRUWHHVWDGtVWLFR$QXDULRVREUH$UPD-
mentismo en España 1986, Barcelona 1986.
31 After the Civil War ended in 1939, the propagandistic rhetoric of Francoism was closely bound WRWKHLGHDRISHDFH$FFRUGLQJWRWKH)UDQFRLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6SDQLVKKLVWRU\IRUWKHÀUVW
time the Nationalist victory had allowed Spanish citizens to live in a lasting social peace with-
out civil wars. Cf. Javier Rodrigo Sánchez, Cruzada, paz, memoria. La guerra civil y sus  relatos, 
Granada 2013.
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For instance, although political citizenship rights became universal, across sections of the SXEOLFRSLQLRQWKHLGHDVSUHDGWKDWVXFKULJKWVDORQHZHUHQRWVXIÀFLHQWWRIRUPDVROLGGH-
mocracy. Social rights, such as those to health, education, information, and gender  equality, 
were now deemed essential and, therefore, action had to be taken to achieve or  strengthen 
them.32,QWKDWUHJDUGLWLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRUHWXUQWRWKHÀUVWPDMRUSHDFHGHPRQVWUDWLRQKHOG
in Madrid in 1981. The day after the demonstration, an editorial in the »El País« news-
paper echoed the democratic sentiment of the protesters: »the people who gathered at Ciu-
dad Universitaria did not do so only to reject the politics of military blocs and rearmament 
but, above all, to express their support for the constitutional order, democratic liberties 
and domestic peace«.33
Although Spanish anti-NATO groups held differing views on the means to extend de-PRFUDF\LQWKHÀQDOVWDJHVRIWKH&ROG:DUWKH\JHQHUDOO\ZHOFRPHGWKHQHZO\LQVWDOOHG
parliamentary institutions. The word »peace« became synonymous with »democracy«: 
peace would only be possible within a consolidated democratic process capable of trans-
forming the attitudes and values of Spanish society. From this perspective, the expansion 
of democracy would subsequently also change Spains relations with the rest of the world 
and move the country towards neutrality. Furthermore, popular grassroots mobilisation 
against NATO and military blocs introduced sections of Spanish society to a diverse ar-
ray of interpretations and practices of democracy, moving beyond the pacts made by the 
political elites that drove the transition.34,QIDFWDFFRUGLQJWRWKHGHÀQLWLRQRISHDFHZLWK-
in a meeting of MC protesters and neighbourhood activists:
»Peace is not, as some people believe, respect for an imposed social order. We do not want the peace 
of the cemeteries or the apparent peace of fear. For true peace, there must also be justice and free-
dom. In sum, for us, peace is not only the absence of personal, physical and psychological violence. 
It is also the practice of social justice«.35
An examination of these debates on democracy within the Spanish grassroots peace move-
ment, which some anti-war activists perceived as the »last battle of the transition«36, re-
veals the groups willingness to make possible an »unpolitical democracy«, that is a de-
mocracy detached from political partisanship and one closer to these groups idea of a 
superior truth and justice.37
32 On different ideas of democracy in Spain, see: Rafael Alday Escudero, Modelos de democracia 
en España, Madrid 2013.
33 Una manifestación con dos lecturas (Editorial), in: El País, 17.11.1981.
34 On the relation between social movement and democracy: Francesca Polletta, Freedom is an 
Endless Meeting. Democracy in American Social Movements, Chicago 2002. Amory Starr / María 
Elena Martínez-Torres / Peter Rosset3DUWLFLSDWRU\'HPRFUDF\LQ$FWLRQ3UDFWLFHVRIWKH=DSD
tistas and the Movimento Sem Terra, in: Latin American Perspectives 38, 2011, issue 2, pp. 102
119. Kevin Mattson, Creating a Democratic Public: The Struggle for Urban Participatory De-
mocracy during the Progressive Era, Pennsylvania 1998. Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary 
Democracy, New York 1980.
35 'RVVLHUª/XFKDSRUODSD]²©0HHWLQJª$FWLYRVSRUOD3D]©$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
Spanish citations have been translated into English by the author.
36 Different Spanish scholars and peace activists had applied this idea in order to describe the peace 
protests during the last stage of the Cold War in Spain. In particular, they underline the return 
to protest of different anti-Francoist groups with young Spaniards. Cf. Antonio García Santes-
mases, Repensar la izquierda. Evolución ideológica del socialismo en la España actual, Madrid 
1993.
37 Nadia Urbinati, Unpolitical Democracy, in: Political Theory 38, 2010, pp. 6592.
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II. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TRANSITION
7KH6SDQLVKSHDFHPRYHPHQWZDQWHGWRRYHUFRPHWKHELSRODURUGHULQWKHÀQDO\HDUVRI
the Cold War. This international aim was inseparable, in the anti-NATO activists master 
frame, from domestic criticism regarding the consensus-oriented model of the transition 
to democracy.38 In order to understand how Spanish grassroots peace activists envisaged GHPRFUDF\LWLVÀUVWQHFHVVDU\WRFRQVLGHUWKDWWKHLUPRELOLVDWLRQIRUQXFOHDUGLVDUPDPHQW
and anti-NATO stance was fuelled by a profound disenchantment GHVHQFDQWR with how 
Spanish democratisation had evolved.39
Unlike in Portugal, the transition process in Spain relied on controlled negotiations be-
tween reformist members of the Francoist apparatus and the democratic opposition. The 
aim of these talks was to avoid a potentially dangerous polarisation in the country, which 
had been destabilised by terrorist violence in the Basque Country and a collapsing econo-
my. Despite the acceleration in response to a relatively high degree of social mobilisation, 
democratic transformation was brought about through bargaining between the political 
elites who gradually dismantled the authoritarian state. Agreements between the elites were 
in many cases sanctioned behind closed doors by strict party discipline. As a result, they 
did not directly involve Spanish society.40 At the same time, the compromise of political-
ly, not culturally, silencing the memory of the Civil War and the excesses of military dic-
tatorship became trademarks of the transition.41 There was no purge of the main political 
and military elites of the dictatorship. The entire process took place in a spirit of reconcilia-
tion and amnesty between the various parties involved.42
Thus, parts of the population saw the lack of a radical break with the dictatorial regime 
as evidence that the previous political system continued to affect the new democracy. Look-LQJEDFNLQWKH&RPPXQLVWSKLORVRSKHUDQGSHDFHDFWLYLVW)HUQDQGR%XH\UHÁHFWHG
on these connections:
»In a certain sense, one can say that the peace movement [] was, in those years, on the other side 
of the current transition. In fact, with its protests, demonstrations and declarations, it brought to light 
all that political democracy had inherited from Francoism and all that the reform, which had been 
negotiated in 19761978, had fallen silent«.43
Protest against the American bases and the bipolar order fell on fertile ground among the 
Spanish population who felt marginalised by the political dynamics of the transition and 
38 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan described the Spanish transition to democracy as a »paradigmatic 
case« of a democratic transition based on political pacts. Juan Linz / Alfred Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore / London 1996, p. 87.
39 On the so-called desencanto of a part of the Spanish society, cf. Santos Juliá, Transición. His-
toria de una política española (19372017), Barcelona 2017, pp. 497533; Teresa M. Vilarós, 
El mono del desencanto. Una crítica cultural de la transición española, Madrid 1998.
40 Cf. Bonnie N. Field, Interparty Consensus and Intraparty Discipline in Spains Transition to 
 Democracy, in: Gregorio Alonso / Diego Muro (eds.), The Politics and Memory of Democratic 
Transition. The Spanish Model, New York / Abingdon 2011, pp. 7191.
41 Paloma Aguilar Fernández / Carsten Humlebaek, Collective Memory and National Identity in 
the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War, in: History and Memo-
ry 14, 2002, no. 12, pp. 121165.
42 Paloma Aguilar, Justice, Politics and Memory in Spanish Transition, in: Alexandra Barahona 
de Brito / Carmen González-Enriquéz / Paloma Aguilar (eds.), The Politics of Memory. Transi-
tional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Oxford / New York etc. 2001, pp. 92118. Antonio 
 Costa Pinto, The Authoritarian Past and South European Democracies: An Introduction, in: 
South European Society and Politics 15, 2010, pp. 339358.
43 Francisco Fernández Buey, Prólogo, in: Enric Prat, Moviéndose por la paz. De Pax Christi a 
las movilizaciones contra la Guerra, Barcelona 2006, pp. IXXXII, p. XIV.
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discouraged by the new democratic institutions.44 This disenchantment led to a critique of 
the legacy of the Franco regime in the new democratic institutions. Consequently, under 
this approach, the peace activists saw the political apathy, low civic participation, and  rigid 
party system that characterised the new democracy as part of the Francoist legacy.45 Against 
this background, the protests for peace were able to unite all those Spanish citizens who 
were disillusioned with the newly-established democracy. They wanted something more 
than the institutions created by the UCD, but also more than was provided by social demo-
cratic Realpolitik. Indeed, the feeling of disenchantment was particularly strong with re-
gard to the Socialist Party and the hopes for participation and social change that it had re-
presented before the 1982 elections. In 1983, an anti-NATO activist asked:
»What has remained a year after the formation of a socialist government? Perhaps American gold 
has worked miracles. If [Felipe González and the PSOE] yield to pressure and blackmail, they will 
enjoy the ridiculous privilege of belonging to an armed alliance. Nevertheless, many, many citizens 
will think they betrayed a sacred principle. Here, almost everyone renounces war«.46
7KHSHDFHPRYHPHQWLQ6SDLQLQWKHHDUO\VZDVDOVRWKHUHVXOWRIWKHGLIÀFXOWLHVDQG
traumas of adapting to the new post-transition society. Many people did not accept the LGHDWKDWFLWL]HQSDUWLFLSDWLRQVKRXOGEHFRQÀQHGWRWKHUROHRIYRWHURU79YLHZHUDQGWKH
belief that the incorporation of citizens into party systems should only be achieved through 
electoral and parliamentary procedures.47 The battles against NATO called for a different 
kind of transition, even though activists did not entirely reject the democratic system. Un-
like the movements of 68, they tried to move within the new democratic institutions.48 
For these activists, democracy primarily implied an opposing view of Spains position in 
the international arena. They considered it was impossible to accept Spanishs entry into 
NATO as a model for the new Spanish democracy. For instance, in the view of the  Albacete 
anti-NATO committee, this constituted a clear example of the expropriation of sovereign-
ty and representative institutions:
»What does supporting NATO entail for Spain? We would not be able to decide our international 
relations with other countries and [it would mean] the loss of national independence. [] It would 
strengthen the militarisation of civil life and prevent the people from exercising democratic control 
over the army«.49
Moreover, they could not accept US support of dictatorships in Latin America as a demo-
cratic model.50 On this point, Carlos Otamendi, a leading personality in the Madrid anti- 
NATO movement, stressed that one of the reasons for the success of the Spanish peace 
44 The word discouragement GHVDOLHQWR is used in: Germán Labrador Méndez, Culpables por la 
literatura. Imaginación política y contracultura en la transición española (19681986), Madrid 
2017, p. 404.
45 Cf. José M. Magone&RQWHPSRUDU\6SDQLVK3ROLWLFV1HZ<RUNÀUVWSXEOLVKHGSS
32 f.
46 Ángel Lasierra, La OTAN. Ha llovido mucho, Felipe, in: Euroshima 1, 1983, p. 2.
47 $GHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQRIWKLVGLIÀFXOW\LQDFFHSWLQJVRPHPHFKDQLVPRIWKHQHZGHPRFUDF\
from the perspective of the literature in: Méndez, Culpables por la literatura, p. 404.
48 Spain lived the experience of May 1968 under the grip of Francoist censorship. However, its so-
cial effects were also felt in this country. Cf. Kostis Kornetis, Tra Marat e Sade. Ripensare il Ses-
santotto »decentrato« in Grecia, Spagna e Portogallo, in: Donatella della Porta (ed.), Sessan-
totto. Passato e Presente dellanno ribelle, Milano 2018, pp. 107134; Patricia Badenes Salazar, 
Fronteras de papel. El Mayo francés en la España del 68, Madrid 2018.
49 /HDÁHW¢4XpHVOD27$1"$QWL1$72&RPPLWWHH$OEDFHWH6DOYDGRU6HJXL)RXQGDWLRQ$UFKLYH0DGULG$)66XQFODVVLÀHG
50 Cf. Michael Cox / Timothy J. Lynch / Nicolas Bouchet (eds.), US Foreign Policy and Democracy 
Promotion. From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, Abingdon / New York 2013.
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movement was: »the devaluation of the principle that it is necessary to defend Western 
values at all costs [] and the loss of the ruling and military elites credibility as a safe-
guard for peace«.51
Spain did not have to follow the US model to become democratic, the Spanish  supporters 
of NATO argued. However, those who supported Spains entry into NATO also used the 
democratic issue as a frame of reference. According to this interpretation, NATO mem-
bership was crucial for overcoming the diplomatic isolation of Francos Spain, for acquir-
ing a foreign policy that was genuinely democratic and in line with other European coun-
tries, and for the modernisation and democratisation of the Spanish army. Moreover, 
according to the reasoning of the UCD, a referendum would represent a challenge to par-
liamentary sovereignty.52 It was no longer necessary for peace groups to focus on a West-
East bipolar model but rather to work towards building more democratic and peaceful re-
lations between the North and South of the world. Indeed, one of the elements that FKDUDFWHULVHGWKH6SDQLVKSDFLÀVWPRYHPHQWZDVLWVVWURQJVROLGDULW\ZLWK/DWLQ$PHUL-
can liberation movements.53
Secondly, in numerous texts of the Spanish peace movement, the opacity of the Spanish 
transition process has been associated with the secret dynamics of the Cold War. Spanish 
activists use the words »pact«, »silence« and »dictatorship« in numerous propaganda texts. )RUH[DPSOHLQDOHDÁHWHQWLWOHGª1HLWKHU1$72QRU%DVHV©ZULWWHQE\DQHQYLURQPHQ-
tal collective in La Cebada district of Madrid, we read: »The dictatorial decision of the 
government to bring us into NATO without considering the will of the people underlines 
the need to provide information on this matter«.54 In the summer of 1980, an information OHDÁHWIURPYDULRXVSDFLÀVWDVVRFLDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJ)ULHQGVRI81(6&2ª&OXEGH$PL-
gos de la UNESCO«), Association for Human Rights (»Asociación Pro Derechos Huma-
nos«) and Association for Security and European Cooperation (»Asociación de Seguridad 
y Cooperación Europea«), declared: »For Peace, Not war pacts«. The same text once again 
correlates NATO with the loss of sovereignty on the part of the Spanish citizenry:
»We consider the state of dependency into which our country would be demoted as a result of its inte-
gration into NATO as an equally serious matter. This organisation has stated on several occasions that 
it would not tolerate a regime different from a liberal-democratic regime in a member state. This re-
sulted in the exclusion of Portugal from Council meetings when the Carnation Revolution took place«.55
Furthermore, peace activists from La Cebada collective interpreted the Italian case of histori-
cal compromise56 as an example of undemocratic intervention by the USA in domestic  affairs: 
»The possibility of communist politicians participating in governments of NATO mem-
ber countries is not acceptable; an example is the strong pressure being exerted by the USA 
in Italy to prevent the Italian Communist Party from participating in the government«.57
51 &DUORV2WDPHQGL3HUVSHFWLYDVGHOPRYLPLHQWRSDFLÀVWDLQ=RQD&HUR([WUD-XO\S
52 'RVVLHUª(VSDxDHQOD27$1©8&',QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQ6HFUHWDU\$)66XQFODVVLÀHG
53 Antonio3DFLÀVPR\PRYLPLHQWRGHOLEHUDFLyQLQ=RQD&HUR-XO\S
54 /HDÁHWª1L27$11L%DVHV©/D&HEDGD&ROOHFWLYH0DGULG²"$)66XQFODVVL-ÀHG
55 /HDÁHWª(VSDxDHQOD27$1"3RUODSD]1RDORVSDFWRVEpOLFRV©$VRFLDFLyQ3UR'HUHFKRV
Humanos, Asociación de Seguridad y Cooperación Europea, Consejo Español de la Paz, Club 
de Amigos de la UNESCO, Asociación de Ex-Presos y Represaliados Políticos, Summer 1980, $)66XQFODVVLÀHG
56 Cf. Silvio Pons, Cold War Republic: The External Constraint in Italy during the 1970s, in: An-
tonio Varsori / Benedetto Zaccaria (eds.), Italy in the International System from Détente to the 
End of the Cold War. The Underrated Ally, Basingstoke 2018, pp. 3567.
57 /HDÁHWª1L27$11L%DVHV©/D&HEDGD&ROOHFWLYH0DGULG²"$)66XQFODVVL-ÀHG
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In summary, for the peace activists, NATO membership would entail a lack of political 
freedom and the imposition from above of a model of democracy that was not the model FKRVHQE\WKH6SDQLVKFLWL]HQV$OHDÁHWE\WKH$VVRFLDWLRQRI)DPLOLHVDQG)ULHQGVRI3R-
litical Prisoners (»Asociación de Familiares y Amigos de Presos Políticos«) called NATO 
the »tomb of peoples« because:
ª1$72ZLOOEULQJXVPRUHDUPHGIRUFHVPRUHSROLFHPRUHHFRQRPLFDQGWHFKQLFDOEHQHÀWVWRÀJKWDJDLQVWDQ\PRYHPHQWZKLFKRSSRVHVWKHFXUUHQWV\VWHP)URPSDFLÀVWVWRDUPHGJURXSVWKH\DUHDOO
persecuted by the fascist fanatics in the Pentagon. [] The repression in the streets and prisons will HVFDODWHDQGUHDFKXQVXVSHFWHGOHYHOVRIVRSKLVWLFDWLRQ7KHHQHP\WKH\ZDQWWRÀJKWLVQRWWKH8665
but the Spanish people, among whom they want to eradicate even the slightest revolutionary sign«.58
Peace movement publications directly associated the Cold War with the oppression of free-
dom by the national-Catholic dictatorship. According to this interpretation, the USA had 
tacitly supported the Franco regime after the Second World War. On several occasions, the 
American and Francoist soldiers were symbolically linked in the visual propaganda of the 
Spanish peace movement. As in other European peace movements, NATO was  associated 
with fascism and the restriction of democratic liberties. There were also recurring  references 
to the trauma of the Civil War, especially the 1937 bombing of Guernica.59
The USSR was once again not included in this democratic quality assessment scheme. 
In fact, during a collective peace meeting, an activist concluded that: »The position re-
garding the USSR is not decisive  it does not outline the strategic line of the movement ZKHQGHÀQLQJLWVYLHZVRQWKHÀJKWDJDLQVWZDU©60
According to peace activists, the escalation of tensions between the two superpowers 
had led to heightened military control directly related to the spread of civil and military 
nuclear power. To curb this supposed manipulation, peace groups protested for the inclu-
sion of citizens opinions in diplomatic and foreign policy decision-making. Citizen input, 
as in the domestic case of the Spanish transition process, had been removed from the rooms 
where the global balance of power was decided. As a result, the demand for transparency 
in military budgets became a common issue for Spanish peace activists. The Anti-NATO 
Committee of the Madrid neighbourhood of San Blas explained why: »Spains entry into 
NATO would result in an increase in the states military expenditure, reducing social ex-
penditure []. In short, it would bring more poverty and unemployment«.61 For this rea-
son, many Spanish activists associated Spains entry into NATO with a negative model of 
democracy. Instead, they supported the idea of a peoples army rather than one in the tra-
ditional mould. They believed the continuing arms race was consolidating the army fur-
ther in an undemocratic direction.
Moreover, in Spain, the fear of army interference in the countrys political life was a 
constant feature of the transition process, and the expression »noise of sabres« was com-
monly used to express apprehension of military coups.627KLVIHDUKHOSHGWRGHÀQHDSHDFH
58 /HDÁHWª27$1&DUFHOHV²7XPEDGHORVSXHEORV$VVRFLDWLRQRI)DPLOLHVDQG)ULHQGVRI3ROLWLFDO3ULVRQHUV$)66XQFODVVLÀHG
59 Cf. the iconography of Pablo Picassos painting »Guernica« in many murals realised by grass-
roots peace groups against NATO in all Spanish territory. Furthermore, the poster against the 
visit of the US Secretary of State George P. Shultz in December 1982 featured parts of Picas-
sos painting. Poster »Contra la visita del secretario de estado USA, Shultz, DL 1982«, 1982, 
Archive of the Spanish National Library Madrid, AHC / 104973.
60 'RVVLHU8566²6RPHFRQFOXVLRQV²&$20DGULGVG$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
61 /HDÁHWª&RQWUDORVEORTXHVPLOLWDUHV)XHUDEDVHV\DQTXLV1RDODHQWUDGDHQOD27$1©$QWL1$72&RPPLWWHH6DQ%ODV0DGULG-DQXDU\$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
62 José García Caneiro / Eduardo Arranz Bueso, The Military Transition to Democracy in Spain: 
Looking for a New Democratic Soldier, in: Papers Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 1, 2007, DYDLODEOHDW85/KWWSVZZZKVINGHÀOHDGPLQ+6).KVINBGRZQORDGV6SDLQBSGI!>@
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movement which, on many occasions, saw the military as a threat to democracy, despite 
the attempts to modernise it during the transition. The anti-NATO activist Eugenio del Río 
explained, in 1983, his main concern:
»The armies that currently exist cannot constitute the structure of a truly acceptable defence. Arms 
control and the exercise of military leadership by a specialised organisation whose members are not 
elected or controlled by the population [] are incompatible with a sovereign defence system and 
self-defence for the people«.63
For the Spanish groups, however, a system of democratic defence should be based on »the 
energies of the people, on popular organization, not on a force external to the people«.64
Peace activists saw the anti-NATO protests as the last good opportunity to shape a differ-
ent transition to democracy in which all key constituencies and groups of actors were in-
volved, including those who had been marginalised by the process itself, such as women. ,WLVWUXHWKDW6SDQLVKZRPHQZHUHDEOHWRYRWHIRUWKHÀUVWWLPHLQWKHÀUVWGHPRFUDWLF
elections of 1977, but it is also true that they were practically excluded from prominent SRVWVZLWKLQWKHSDUWLHV,QWKHÀUVWSDUOLDPHQWRIPHPEHUVRQO\GHSXWLHVDQGVL[VHQDWRUVZHUHZRPHQ,QDGGLWLRQLQWKHÀUVWVRFLDOLVWJRYHUQPHQW²GHÀQHGDVWKHJRY-
ernment of change  there were no female ministers.65
The anti-NATO groups, by contrast, tried to include people from social categories that 
had been excluded from the institutions negotiating the transition. This included not only 
women but also men who did not identify with the military model or patriarchal mascu-
linity associated with Spanish parliamentary parties. On this point, María Gascón, a  Madrid 
peace activist, concluded during a collective debate that peace was not only the counter-
point of the war but »a social situation of non-oppression and non-aggression. It helps to 
question the fundamental pillars (ideological, economic, and political) of a system that 
embraces the current situation«.66
III. CREATING SOCIAL SPACES FOR PARTICIPATION: THE NEIGHBOURHOOD MOVEMENT
,QWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKHÀUVWPDUFKWR7RUUHMyQLQ-DQXDU\LQIRUPDODQWL1$72FRP-
mittees (»Comités anti-Otan«) were founded in neighbourhoods and factories across Spain.67 
They were organised by men and women who were concerned about their personal secu-
rity in towns and villages near the four US air and naval bases.68 They feared that entry 
into the Atlantic Alliance would cause Spain to be a target of an atomic attack because of 
63 Eugenio del Río, Mañana puede ser tarde. Libro negro de la OTAN, Madrid 1983, p. 61.
64 Ibid.
65 Cf. Giulia Quaggio, La cuestión femenina en el PSOE de la Transición, in: Arenal 24, 2017, pp. 
219253.
66 María Gascón0XMHU3DFLÀVPR0LOLWDULVPRLQ=RQD&HUR'HEDWH-XO\S
67 According to Donatella della Porta, citizens committees are weakly structured groups of citi-
zens who meet on a territorial basis. They predominantly protested to oppose interventions that 
would harm the quality of life on their territory or called for improvements in it. Cf. Donatella 
della Porta (ed.), Comitati di Cittadini e Democrazia Urbana, Cosenza 2004, p. 7. Chiara Se-
bastiani, Comitati cittadini e spazi pubblici urbani, in: Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia 42, 2001, 
pp. 77114. Massimiliano Andretta / Gianni Piazza / Anna Subirats, Urban Dynamics and Social 
Movements, in: Donatella della Porta / Mario Diani (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social 
Movements, Oxford / New York etc. 2014, pp. 200215. Jeffrey M. Berry / Kent E. Portney / Ken 
Thompson, The Rebirth of Urban Democracy, Washington 1993.
68 Local interests also mobilised lots of citizens during the 1970s in the USA. Cf. Michael  Stewart 
Foley, Front Porch Politics. The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s, 
New York 2013.
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the presence of the US military bases. The sentiment of uncertainty over what could happen LI6SDLQZHUHWREHFRPHSDUWRIWKH$WODQWLF$OOLDQFHDQGDIWHULWVRIÀFLDOHQWU\LQ
the desire to leave it and remain neutral led many Spanish men and women to come to-JHWKHUWRGHEDWHDQGRUJDQLVHDFWLYLWLHVDWDORFDOOHYHOWRÀJKWIRUSHDFHDQGGLVDUPDPHQW696RRQDIWHUWKHÀUVWJURXSVKDGEHHQIRXQGHGWKHDQWL1$72&RPPLVVLRQ&$2DQ
umbrella body of grassroots peace groups in Madrid, was established.70 It published the MRXUQDOª=RQD&HUR©=HUR=RQH,QDQDUWLFOHLQª=RQD&HUR©UHFDOOHGKRZWKHVH
committees were formed in the wake of the protest march against Torrejón air base:
ª>7@KHÀUVWJURXSVZHUHERUQLQQHLJKERXUKRRGVDQGZRUNSODFHV7KHPRYHPHQWZDVDFTXLULQJRQH
of its main characteristics: its basic, participatory and democratic character. [] There are more than 
25 committees and local collectives that meet weekly, in addition to environmental groups, anti- 
militarist, alternative and objector groups []. It would be impossible to quantify what has been 
done by the different committees. Murals, propaganda stands, public events and solidarity festi-
vals, meetings and information events, caravans of cars«.71
Thus, the initial impetus motivating the peace protests came from the subculture of civic 
activism and dissent that emerged from these neighbourhood groups during the early  stages 
of the transition. As sociologist Manuel Castells recalls, the Spanish citizen movement re-
presented a point of reference within the European urban movements during the seven-
ties.72 Initially, this movement came as a spontaneous response to the poor living condi-
69 On the development of these anti-NATO citizens committees, see: *RQ]DOR:LOKHOPL, El movi-
miento por la paz en Madrid, de la transición al primer Gobierno socialista (19751986), in: pa-
per at Congreso Internacional Historia de la Época Socialista España 19821996, 2011,  available DW85/KWWSZZZKLVWRULDGHOSUHVHQWHHVVLWHVGHIDXOWÀOHVFRQJUHVRVSGIHFR\VRFLHGDG
Wilhelmi.pdf> [4.4.2018].
70 A testimony on CAO of a former activist at URL: <http://www.nazanin.es/?p=6022> [4.4.2018]. 7KHÀUVWSHDFHFRPPLWWHHVLQ0DGULGDSSHDUHGLQ,Q2FWREHUWKH&$2ZDVFRP-
posed mainly by neighbourhood peace committees (Vallecas, Moratalaz, Barrio del Pilar, San 
Blas, Prosperidad, Aluche, Chamberí), town peace committees (i. e. Leganés, Getafe, Fuenlabra-
da), factory peace committees (i. e. Bimbo, Correos, Telefónica) and the Commission for Free-
dom of Expression (Comisión para la Libertad de Expresión), AEPDEN (Association for the 
Study and Protection of the Environment, Asociación de Estudios y Protección de la  Naturaleza), 
MOC (Movement of Conscientious Objectors), MC, LCR and local groups of the PCE and PCEU 8QLÀHG&RPPXQLVW3DUW\RI6SDLQ²3DUWLGR&RPXQLVWDGH(VSDxD8QLÀFDGR&IPablo  Socorro 
Arencibia, La última batalla de la transición: las organizaciones del movimiento anti-OTAN, 
Trabajo de Final de Master, Oviedo 2015, p. 53, URL: <http://digibuo.uniovi.es/dspace/bitstream/ 7)0B6RFRUUR$UHQFLELD3DEORSGI!>@
71 /D&$2HQODFDEH]DGHOPRYLPLHQWRSRUODSD]LQ=RQD&HURQRSS²S
72 There is a rich historiography on the Spanish neighbourhood movement during this period, see: 
Manuel Castells, Productores de ciudad: el movimiento ciudadano de Madrid, in: Vicente Pérez 
Quintana / Pablo Sánchez León (eds.), Memoria ciudadana y movimiento vecinal. Madrid (1968
2008), Madrid 2008, pp. 2132, here: p. 21; Manuel Castells, Urban Social Movements and the 
Struggle for Democracy: The Citizens Movement in Madrid, in: International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 2, 1978, pp. 133146; id., The City and the Grassroots. A Cross- Cultural 
Theory of Urban Social Movements, Berkeley / Los Angeles 1983; Jesús Ibáñez, Por una socio-
logía de la vida cotidiana, Madrid 1994. Carme Molinero / Pere Ysàs (eds.), Construint la ciutat 
democràtica. El moviment veïnal durant el tardofranquisme i la transició, Bellaterra 2010;  Pamela 
Radcliff, Making Democratic Citizen in Spain. Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Tran-
sition, 196078, Basingstoke / New York 2011; Ivan Bordetas Jiménez, Nosotros somos los que 
hemos hecho esta ciudad. Auto-organización y movilización vecinal durante el tardofranquis-
mo y el proceso de cambio político, PhD Thesis, Barcelona 2012; 7HUHVD0DUtD2UWHJD/ySH], 
Trabajadores y vecinos. Una aproximación al movimiento obrero y vecinal en el tardofranquis-
mo y la Transición. Granada, 19681978, in: Alberto Ramos (ed.), La transición política y so-
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tions in Spanish metropolitan areas, which were created by the unbalanced development 
model of Francoism. Local grievances with housing, the remodelling of suburban neigh-
bourhoods, the environment and, more generally, the urban revitalisation of the previous 
decade, also served as direct incentives for the Spanish peace mobilisations.73
The citizens movement was able to generate new social spaces in which not only Com-PXQLVWSDUW\PLOLWDQWVEXWDOVR\RXQJSHRSOHDQGZRPHQZLWKRXWDQ\SDUW\SROLWLFDODIÀOLD
tion could express their own ideas. Thus, strictly material demands merged with demands 
for political democracy in a spontaneous, non-ideological way.
In other words, atomic fear pushed those who gathered in these committees to organise 
themselves at a local level. These citizens, while aware of the inevitability of Spains en-
try into NATO, considered it harmful for their local communities. In contrast, the Soviet 
Union was perceived as distant74 and having little bearing on the security and material 
well-being of Spain. Local battles against American bases rehabilitated the participatory YLVLRQRIGHPRFUDF\VSUHDGE\QHLJKERXUKRRGPRYHPHQWVGXULQJWKHÀQDO\HDUVRIWKH
dictatorship.
The peace committees measured democracy in terms of quality of participation and, as 
a result, the idea of peace was closely tied to the ways in which citizens were involved in SXEOLFOLIHª=RQD&HUR©ZDVH[SOLFLWDERXWWKLVª,WLVQRWDPDWWHURIMXGJLQJDVRFLHW\
but it must be pointed out that democracy is not only assessed by votes but also by its con-
ditions and the freedom that citizens acquire and experience«.757KHFDVHRIWKHSHDFHFROOHFWLYHLQ=DUDJR]DSURYLGHVDQLQVLJKWLQWRWKHSUDFWLFHVRI
democracy within the Spanish peace movement and its consequences for post-Francoist 
society. The Collective for Peace and Disarmament in the city of Aragon was established 
to satisfy the urgent need for mobilisation due to the presence of the nearby US Air Force 
base.76 Secondly, it effectively represented the ideal of decentralised democracy to which 
the peace activists tended. It arose from the call of the Catalan Committee for Peace and 
Disarmament, in October 1982, with the aim of organising a week for peace, the banning 
of the atomic bomb and other weapons of mass destruction. At this point, there was little 
time and the citizens had to rush to coordinate the mobilisation. Some citizens spoke to WKH<RXWK&RXQFLORI=DUDJR]DLQWHQGLQJWRFRQYHQHDPHHWLQJRIDOOFLYLFERGLHVLQWKH
auction room of the municipality.77
Thus, the collective was organised during a meeting in the town hall, which over 50 
people attended. During the meeting, it was concluded that a campaign had to be arranged 
to »de-marginalize the topic of peace in our cities«.78 Nevertheless, »a controversial deci-
sion was agreed upon: this manifesto should be signed by all bodies except political par-
cial en Andalucía, Cádiz 2005, pp. 257276; Ricard Martínez i Muntada, Movimiento vecinal, 
antifranquismo y anticapitalismo, in: Historia, trabajo y sociedad 2, 2011, pp. 6390.
73 The historiography on the relation between the Spanish neighbourhood movement and the peace 
committees is still limited. Cf. Manuel Guerrero, Veinte años de encuentros y desencuentros de 
las Asociaciones de Vecinos, Madrid 1998, pp. 48 f.
74 On the relation between Spain and the USSR during the Spanish transition, cf. Juan Carlos Pe-
reira Castañares, España y la U. R. S. S. en una Europa en transformación, in: Cuadernos de His-
toria Contemporánea 15, 1993, pp. 189206; Magdalena Garrido Caballero, Las relaciones en-
tre España y la Unión Soviética a través de las Asociaciones de Amistad en el siglo XX, PhD 
Thesis, Murcia 2006.
75 Javier Sabada(OWHUFHUURVWURGH-DQRHVODFDUDGXUDLQ=RQD&HURQRSS²S
76 Concha Roldán/RV$PHULFDQRVHQ=DUDJR]D/DSUHVHQFLDGHODV)XHU]DV$pUHDVGH(VWDGRV8QLGRVHQODEDVH²=DUDJR]D
77 Victor Viñuales, Una historia breve pero densa. El colectivo por la paz y el desarme, in: Euroshi-
ma 1, 1983, pp. 45, p. 4.
78 Ibid.
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ties«.797KHRULJLQVRIWKH=DUDJR]DSHDFHFROOHFWLYHZHUHURRWHGLQDQLGHDRIGHPRFUDF\
in which the decision-making process did not depend on either the state or local bureau-
cracies but on the interpersonal solidarity of a grassroots movement and the networks it 
had developed over time. Within a short time, 75 citizen groups supported this manifesto. 
They came from heterogeneous backgrounds and included the Diocesan Catholic Action 
Board (»Junta Diocesana de la Acción Católica«)80, the Scouts, the »Peña El Brabán« (a 
group that organised the celebration for the local patron saints), the CNT-A, an anarchist WUDGHXQLRQEXWDOVRWKH2IÀFLDO&ROOHJHRI'RFWRUVDQG*UDGXDWHVLQ3KLORVRSK\DQG/HW-WHUVª&ROHJLR2ÀFLDOGH'RFWRUHV\/LFHQFLDGRVHQ)LORVRItD/HWUDV\&LHQFLD©DQGWKH
Esperanto Group: »In practice it is clear that, faced with crazy and harmful mandarins, it 
is necessary to put up a common and very broad front«.81 The danger was sensed at a lo-
cal level and this brought about intersectional solidarity against the decisions of the cen-
tral institutions, or the mandarins, that is to say the bureaucrats, in Madrid.
The unity of such a diverse array of groups cut across their ideological differences. At 
least initially, it was based on the perception of individuals that they had to take urgent FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ<HWDIWHUWKHÀUVWGHPRFUDWLFORFDOHOHFWLRQVLQLWEHFDPHDSSDUHQW
that municipal governments, dominated by the parties of the left, wanted to intervene in 
the work of the local peace groups. Proposals for participatory democracy were steadily re-
placed by the concept of citizen participation, which implied that local administrations could 
bring the activities of its citizens into the fold of formal institutions at the local level.82,QWKHH[DPSOHRIWKH=DUDJR]D3HDFHDQG'LVDUPDPHQW&ROOHFWLYHGHPRFUDF\ZDVSUDF
tised not only in terms of a union of heterogeneous groups but also in their practical orga-
nisation. The Collective organised a peace awareness week by convening general assem-
blies every Wednesday at the House of Catholic Action (»Casa de la Acción Católica«):
»[] representatives from groups as well as independent citizens enter here without impediment. 
Most practical tasks are carried out by working committees formed only of those who want to con-
tribute []. The main results of the week are: [] above all, the consolidation of a small group of 
people who belong to different traditions and cultures (mainly Christian, Marxist and libertarian)«.83
7KH=DUDJR]D&ROOHFWLYHZDVRIÀFLDOO\HVWDEOLVKHGWKDQNVWRDQDVVHPEO\RIFLWL]HQVZKR
wanted to continue mobilizing after the peace awareness week. The open-door assembly, 
much like in post-1968 movements, was the preferred form of decision-making and direct 
democracy.841HYHUWKHOHVVWKH=DUDJR]D&ROOHFWLYH·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\ZDVLQ-ÁXHQFHGE\WKHSHDFHJURXSVZKLFKLQWHQGHGWRJREH\RQGWKHDVVHPEO\PRGHORIVWX-GHQWPRYHPHQWV$ERYHDOOWKH\ZDQWHGWRDYRLGWKHGDQJHURIEHLQJVWLÁHGE\WKHPRUHLQÁXHQWLDOOHDGHUVDPRQJWKHP85 Liberal democracy relies on the principles of delegation 
79 Ibid.
80 This was the local directive of the »Acción Católica Española« (ACE). On the history of the 
ACE: Feliciano Montero, El movimiento católico en España, Madrid 1993.
81 Viñuales, Una historia breve pero densa, p. 4.
82 Some scholars on the Spanish neighbourhood movement have diagnosed a crisis of this move-
ment during the 1980s because of its absorption into local administrations. Cf. Tomás Rodríguez 
Villasante, Historia del movimiento vecinal y retos para las democracias participativas, in: Pérez 
Quintana / Sánchez León, Memoria ciudadana y movimiento vecinal, pp. 231262, here: p. 237; 
Tomás Alberich Nistal, Aspectos cuantitativos del asociacionismo en España, in: Documenta-
ción Social, 1994, no. 94, pp. 5374.
83 Viñuales, Una historia breve pero densa, p. 4.
84 On the role of assembly as a »theatre« in the 1968 movement, see: 3HSSLQR2UWROHYD, Saggio 
sui movimenti del 1968 in Europa e in America, Roma 1988, p. 115.
85 Cf. Jo Freeman, The Tyranny of Structurelessness, in: The Berkeley Journal of Sociology 17, 
1973, pp. 151165.
6SDQLVK3URWHVWVIRU3HDFHGXULQJWKH/DVW'HFDGHRIWKH&ROG:DU² 293 
DQGPDMRULW\YRWLQJ\HWWKH=DUDJR]D&ROOHFWLYHUHMHFWHGWKHSULQFLSOHRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
»a person is only worth one vote and does not represent anyone but himself«.86 The Col-OHFWLYHLWVHOIZDVQRWFRQFHLYHGDVªDSDFLÀVWJURXSWREHUXQZLWKDVHWURXWLQH©7KHUHZDVQRRIÀFHRIDQ\NLQGª7KHUHLVQRGHFLVLRQPDNLQJVWUXFWXUHRWKHUWKDQWKHDVVHP-
bly, through which everything passes. [] There is no division between those who think 
and those who work manually because this separation encourages placing a harmful em-
phasis on power rather than participation«.877KHÀQDODLPZDVWRFUHDWHDPRUHRSHQDQGHJDOLWDULDQVRFLHWDOVWUXFWXUHWKDWFRXOG
pave the way for a deliberative democracy.88 In this sense, the peace movement differed 
from post-1968 mobilisation in its search for tolerance and through its practice of continu-RXVGHEDWHDQGUHDVRQHGRSLQLRQVKDULQJ,WZDVDUHÁH[LYHPRGHORIVRFLDELOLW\WKDWVWULYHG
towards the construction of multiple critical public spaces. It was also oriented towards 
well-founded criticism and the development of topics that facilitated the construction of 
larger arenas for the exchange of ideas on peace and the nuclear danger.
Nonetheless, the small local groups aimed to assemble in larger forums and, from 1983 
onwards, they did indeed hold larger collective meetings. The data are revealing: in the ÀUVWQDWLRQDOPHHWLQJRISHDFHJURXSVWKDWWRRNSODFHLQ=DUDJR]DLQDERXWRU-
ganisations attended.89%\WKLVÀJXUHKDGJURZQWRJURXSV90 In 1984, a dossier 
on the results of a peace meeting highlighted the positive trend of the Spanish peace move-
ment in moving from the local to the national level: »It also indicates a tendency to con-VROLGDWHQDWLRQDOUHJLRQDODQGSURYLQFLDODIÀQLW\IRUWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQRIWKHVHERGLHVDQG
evaluates this as a positive tool. It would be advisable for choices to be made  if pos-
sible  by coordination groups or at least to aim for this objective«.91
At the national level, the organisational model was identical to that of small local groups. +RZHYHUWKHUHZDVQRODFNRIFRQÁLFWLQJSRVLWLRQVWRHQULFKWKHGHOLEHUDWLYHQDWXUHRIWKH
meetings. Some of the points that generated endless debates among Spanish peace activ-
ists are outlined in an Andalusian MC dossier:
»There are questions within this group that are today clearly grounds for division: for example, the 
topic of the form of our struggle (non-violence), the question of terrorism in the Basque Country, 
the feminist question, and solidarity with other struggles and social movements. On such issues, 
there are varying degrees of interest, or simply a lack of interest«.92
In summary, the disagreement between the activists arose from the possibility of justify-
ing violent means in the struggle for peace (as in the case of Salvadorian and Nicaraguan 
86 Viñuales, Una historia breve pero densa, p. 5.
87 Ibid.
88 A further practice in order to reform representative democracy is deliberative democracy. Ac-
cording to this concept, it is particularly important to discuss and to debate within the process 
of decision-making. Deliberation in democratic process would secure the public good through 
reason rather than through political power. Cf. Christian F. Rostbøll, Deliberative Freedom. De-
liberative Democracy as Critical Theory, New York 2008.
89 'LUHFFLRQHVGHORVJUXSRVSDUWLFLSDQWHVHQHOSULPHUHQFXHQWURGHRUJDQL]DFLRQHVSDFLÀVWDV=DUDJR]D0D\$0&XQFODVVLÀHG$QRWKHUOLVWRI6SDQLVKSHDFHJURXSV3RUODSD]HQ(V-
paña, in: Derechos Humanos. Grupo de Información sobre el Desarme y la Paz, November 1983.
90 Cf. Socorro Arencibia, El papel de la izquierda revolucionaria en la vertebración del movimien-
to anti-OTAN en el Estado español.
91 $FWDGHOD&RRUGLQDGRUD(VWDWDOGH2UJDQL]DFLRQHV3DFLÀVWDV0DGULG-XQH²-XO\$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
92 Dossier »Información Movimiento Antimilitarista y por la Paz. Andalucía«, July 1983, AMC, XQFODVVLÀHG
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guerrillas93) or the possibility of converting the peace movement into a »movement of 
movements«.94 On the latter question, suggestions were invited from other movements re-
garding the anti-NATO struggle, including the feminist and environmental movements on 
how to deal with the army and conscientious objection. These were not addressed in the 
same way by activists. For instance, the conscientious objectors and non-violent collec-
tives who joined the peace committees voiced strong criticism of all armies (not just the 
Francoist army) and opposed all military spending. However, other peace groups did not 
support an anti-militarist line with the same intensity.95 This was evident during Armed 
Forces Day (»Día de las Fuerzas Armadas«) in Valladolid in 1984, when protests did not 
receive as much support as anti-NATO demonstrations.96
Ultimately, the central aim in experimenting with a bottom-up form of democracy, af-
ter years of dictatorship, was to seek unity and discussion between groups with different 
perspectives, and this distinguished peace groups from previous local endeavours during WKHDQWL)UDQFRLVWVWUXJJOHª7KLVUHDOLW\KDVWKHEHQHÀWRIDWWUDFWLQJWKHDWWHQWLRQRIYDVW
sectors of the people. The danger of war, NATO, disapproval of the army [] are issues 
that raise awareness in a large part of the population. [] It also develops solidarity be-
tween different radical and reformist forces«.97
Issue-based discussions during the assemblies and the dissemination of information on QXFOHDUGHYHORSPHQWVEHFDPHDFHQWUDOIRFXVRIORFDOFRPPLWWHHVª=RQD&HUR©RIWHQDG-
vised its readers that informational material on the risks of atomic weapons and on NATO 
was available for local committees or individuals with an interest in such issues. These 
were mostly Spanish translations of Edward P. Thompsons pamphlet »Protest and Sur-
vive« (»Protesta y sobrevive«)98 and John Paul Lederachs writing on peace education 
(»Educar por la paz«), or essays such as »Mañana puede ser tarde. Libro negro de la OTAN« 
(»Tomorrow may be too late. Black book on NATO«) by Eugenio del Río, a former  Maoist 
and MC leader.99 According to some peace committees, the concept of democracy had to 
be understood as a form of citizens empowerment. In other words, participatory democra-
93 5HVXPHQ*UXSR0RYLPLHQWR3DFLÀVWD\0RYLPLHQWRVGH/LEHUDFLyQ,,(QFXHQWUR2UJDQL]D-FLRQHV3DFLÀVWDV$0&XQFODVVLÀHGBasajauna(QWRUQRDODYLROHQFLDLQ=RQD&HUR
Extra, July 1984, pp. 1719.
94 Cf. Joaquín Piñeiro Blanca(YROXFLyQGHODLGHDGHSD]HQORVPRYLPLHQWRVSDFLÀVWDVGXUDQWHHOÀQDOGH ODGLFWDGXUDIUDQTXLVWD\ OD WUDQVLFLyQHQ(VSDxD LQPilar Folguera / Juan Carlos 
Pereira Castañares / Carmen García García et al. (eds.), Pensar con la historia desde el siglo 
XXI. Actas del XII Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, Madrid 2014, pp. 
33493371.
95 Cf. Piños0LOLWDULVPR\DQWLPLOLWDULVPRLQ=RQD&HUR([WUD-XO\S
96 Carlos Yárnoz, La celebración del Día de las Fuerzas Armadas coincide con la proliferación de SROpPLFDVVREUHOD27$1\HOSDFLÀVPRLQ(O3DtV
97 Ibid.
98 Edward P. Thompsons work as historian arrived late in Spain. Nevertheless, his essays as peace 
activist were already translated in 1983. Cf. Edward P. Thompson, Opción Cero, Barcelona 1983 ÀUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ(QJOLVKid./DJXHUUDGHODVJDOD[LDV%DUFHORQDÀUVWSXEOLVKHG
in English 1985); id.1XHVWUDVOLEHUWDGHV\QXHVWUDVYLGDV%DUFHORQDÀUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ
English 1985). All these books were edited by the Spanish publishing house Crítica. Cf. Santos 
Juliá, Thompson en castellano, tarde y mal, in: El País, 7.9.1993.
99 Eugenio del Río, Mañana puede ser tarde. Libro negro de la OTAN, Madrid 1983. Other books 
that were accessible to the citizens: id., La razón de la fuerza, Madrid 1982; Vicenç Fisas, Cri-
sis del militarismo y militarización de la crisis, Barcelona 1982. In addition, many dossiers com-
piled by the CAO (central Anti-NATO Committee in Madrid) were available on unilateralism / 
multilateralism, on the European Community and its security system and the papers of the Span-
ish peace groups during the conventions of the European Nuclear Disarmament movement in 
Perugia (Italy).
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cy should be utilised not as a means of bestowing power on others but rather to increase 
the capacity of Spanish citizens to process information on a possible  and increasingly 
likely  nuclear war.
The activities of these groups posed a symbolic but nonetheless real challenge to the 
model of representative democracy, which had only been recently adopted in Spain. They HPERGLHGQRWRQO\DIRUXPIRUDERWWRPXSGHEDWHEXWDOVRDQDOWHUQDWLYHFRGLÀFDWLRQRI
democracy for Spanish society. According to anti-war activists, democracy was based not 
only on the binding legal power of laws or institutional decisions but also on the strength 
of collective orientation and opinion expressed through action and discussion.
In this regard, much like other peace movements in southern Europe, the Spanish peace 
movement made abundant use of symbolic referenda as an instrument of direct democra-
cy. One groups essential demand was to hold a referendum so that the Spanish people 
themselves could decide whether the country should be part of the Atlantic Alliance. Nu-
merous simulated referenda were held throughout Spain.100 A local report described how 
workers at the Philips Groups Barcelona »Miniwatt« plant organised a referendum by set-WLQJRXWEDOORWER[HVDFURVVWKHVKRSÁRRU7KHLUEDOORWSDSHUUHDGª'R\RXVXSSRUW6SDLQ·V
exit from NATO and the dismantling of North American bases in our country?« From 5 
a.m. until 5 p.m., ballot boxes were open for the 1,032 workers to answer this question. 
Results: 740 participants, 292 abstentions, 693 votes in favour of the motion.101
Another phenomenon connected with grassroots anti-NATO protests was the prolifera-
tion of free radio stations, which tried to spread information as an alternative to that pro-
vided by mainstream culture. By proposing different lifestyles, they tried to broaden the 
recently acquired right to freedom of information. For example, »Radio Cero« of the Anti- 
NATO Commission was set up in 1984 in Madrid. Between 1983 and 1987, many other LQGHSHQGHQWEURDGFDVWHUVDIÀOLDWHGZLWKQHLJKERXUKRRGJURXSVÁRXULVKHG0RVWRIWKHVHUDGLRVWDWLRQVÀUPO\VXSSRUWHGWKHFDPSDLJQWROHDYH1$72102
The visual repertoire of peace protests also invoked an idea of democracy that differed 
from mere political representation. In this sense, the methods adopted by local Spanish 
groups were not unlike those of other European protest groups during the latter stages of 
the Cold War. Marches, human chains, and the formation of silent cordons of activists on 
the streets aimed to evoke symbolically the principles of solidarity and collectivism and, 
therefore, the desire for shared participation in public decision-making. Another example 
of Spanish peace groups democratising practices was the creation of murals. This was one 
of the most common activities carried out by local committees in Spain, which intended 
to raise awareness and take a stand against the Spains entry into the Western bloc.103 The 
100 7KHLQVSLUDWLRQIRUWKHVHUHIHUHQGXPVZDVSUREDEO\WKHÀUVW%ULWLVKUHIHUHQGXPWKHIDPRXV
peace ballot, which in 19341935 tried to ascertain public opinion on the League of Nations 
and collective security. Martin Ceadel, The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934
1935, in: The English Historical Review 95, 1980, pp. 810839. Another inspiration may have FRPHIURPWKH.UHIHOGDSSHDORIWKH:HVW*HUPDQSHDFHPRYHPHQW1RYHPEHUZKLFKLQYLWHG:HVW*HUPDQFLWL]HQVWRVLJQDSOHGJH&I85/KWWSJKGLJKLGFRUJVXEBGRFXPHQW FIP"GRFXPHQWBLG !>@
101 José Gutiérrez Álvarez, Miniwatt Philips. La memoria obrera, Madrid 2003, p. 85.
102 José Pérez Emilio Martín, Libertad en las ondas. La radio libre española y el discurso de la de-
mocratización de las comunicaciones (19761989), in: Julio Pérez Serrano / Rebeca Viguera 
Ruiz (eds.), De la guerra al consenso: el lenguaje de la dictadura y la democracia en España, 
Madrid 2013, pp. 285294.
103 On the creation of murals during the Spanish transition and its aftermath, see: Pedro Sempere, 
Los muros del postfranquismo, Valencia 1977; Alexandre Cirici, Murals per la Llibertat, Bar-
celona 1977; Tomás Muñoz Asensio, Arte Mural Urbano, Madrid 19811991, Madrid 1993; 
María Luisa Grau Tello/DSLQWXUDPXUDOHQODHVIHUDS~EOLFDGH=DUDJR]DLQ$UWLJUDPD5H-
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murals were created collectively by activists and neighbourhood movements with the in-
volvement of some professionals and artists. One mural in Barcelona in 1977 even declared: 
»Dont vote. Paint!«.104 Sometimes, people would grab paint and brushes to express their 
anti-NATO messages using the grey walls of the suburbs as their canvas. It is interesting 
to remember how, as portrayed in the iconography of the murals, the strength of the  people 
united was able to break down barriers, drive out soldiers, and expel giant nuclear mis-
siles.105
For instance, the poster advertising the second »run for neutrality« on 16 November 
1985 in Madrid, which had the support of numerous associations and districts in the capi-
tal, clearly expressed the strong participatory legacy of the citizens movement among the 
peace activists.106 In the centre of the poster stands the Puerta de Alcalá (Alcalá Gate), the 
meeting point for the race, and like the rays emanating from a large star, different groups 
of demonstrators are seen arriving. They arrive from every point in the city, or rather, from 
the suburbs  from Alcorcón, Vallecas, and Fuenlabrada  to protest in the heart of  Madrid. 
For these movements, democracy was synonymous with territorial decentralisation, which 
was considered the best organisational instrument to gain better control of decision-mak-
ing powers in foreign policy and national security. Moreover, the appreciation of the inti-
mate dimension, its small scale and the concreteness, was a direct product of the political 
culture of the new social movements of the 1970s, from which the Spanish peace move-
ment also drew inspiration.107
The strong connections between local spaces, localised citizen movements, and the Span-
ish struggle for peace becomes clear when we consider that Spain was one of the Euro-
pean countries with the highest number of municipalities that declared themselves nuclear- 
free zones. According to an essay by researcher and activist Vicenç Fisas, at the end of 
1983, 323 Spanish municipalities had taken the symbolic step of declaring themselves nu-
clear-free zones. There were 156 in England, 281 in Belgium and 86 in West Germany.108 
The same author explained the spirit that fuelled this symbolic process:
»What is expected here [] is not the need for a new form of class struggle or a traditional revolu-WLRQ7KHSXUSRVHLVYHU\VLPSOHLQLWVIRUPXODWLRQHYHQLIFRPSOH[DQGGLIÀFXOWLQLWVUHDOL]DWLRQ
a break from collaboration with rulers in matters of security and international relations, and a break 
from the delegation of power that society and people have participated in for decades [] The fun-
damental change that must be implemented concerns active participation in the disarmament pro-
cess. If the people, the people in the street, the small communities, become aware that it is their se-
curity at stake, they will be able to take part in the formulation of this alternative strategy«.109
YLVWDGH+LVWRULDGHO$UWHGHO'HSDUWDPHQWRGH+LVWRULDGHO$UWHGHOD8QLYHUVLGDGGH=DUDJR-
za 27, 2012, pp. 637640.
104 Id., Cuando los muros hablan. Una aproximación a la pintura mural en el espacio urbano du-
rante la Transición, in: Arte y Ciudad. Revista de Investigación, 2013, no. 3, pp. 7190, here: 
p. 73.
105 Cf. the collection of anti-NATO mural photos given by Alejandro de Diego in 2014 to the Sal-
vador Segui Foundation in Madrid.
106 Poster 2. Carrera popular por la neutralidad. OTAN No. Bases fuera, 1985, Archive Founda-
tion Pablo Iglesias (AFPI).
107 Susanne Schregel, The Spaces and Places of the Peace Movement, in: Cristoph Becker-Schaum / 
Philipp Gassert / Martin Klimke et al. (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War 
Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York / Oxford 2016, pp. 173
188, here: pp. 174 f.
108 6SDQLVKÀJXUHVRQQXFOHDUIUHH]RQHVDUHLPSUHVVLYH1HYHUWKHOHVV%HOJLXPKDGPRUHQXFOHDU
free zones per capita.
109 Vicenç Fisas, El desarme en casa. Municipios desnuclearizados y desarme regional, Barcelo-
na 1985, p. 9.
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Clearly, the practice of declaring nuclear-free zones represented a further example of a 
new conception of democracy that decentralised powers and functions in order to embrace 
new forms of self-management. These procedures contemplated foreign policy and inter-QDWLRQDOGLSORPDF\LQVXFKDZD\DVWRFRPEDWZKDWª=RQD&HUR©FDOOHGªDUHJXODWRU\GH-
mocracy in the shadow of NATO«.110
IV. UNPOLITICAL DEMOCRACY
In Spain, many peace activists were troubled by the political parties increasing interfer-
ence in their collective mobilisation. Analysing a similar phenomenon of tension in Italy, 
Donatella della Porta shows how the peace movements frequent cooperation with left-
wing parties (especially the Communist party) was at odds with the search for autonomy 
from a party system that was beginning to be seen as delegitimised.111
The endorsement and interference of newly legalised parties also became a point of fric-
tion within the Spanish movement for nuclear disarmament. A report from a 1983 meet-
ing of the Communist Movement underlined this refusal of political partisanship in large 
sections of the peace movement:
»all left-wing opposition [] is more and more interested in driving this movement (noting the un-
usual interest of the PCE to place itself at the head of the peace movement). [] The peace move-
ment also involves rather problematic aspects. There is a strong tendency towards a certain utopian 
vision, that is to say, to see itself as a mouthpiece of the most transcendent political and social de-PDQGV>«@,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHLQFHQWLYHWRIRUPD¿SDFLÀVWSDUW\¾PD\EHVWURQJHUWKDQWKRVHH[-
isting in other movements [] and, therefore, the tendency to declare war against traditional par-
ties can proliferate with greater ease (where they lump together reformists and revolutionaries)«.112
This dossier echoes several patterns that were prevalent within the Spanish peace move-
ment. First, the Spanish Lefts drive to politicise the movement, but also its feeling of re-
jection by these peace groups. Second, resistance to political interference problematised 
the parties: it was the direct result of the interaction of several cultural milieus within the 
movement, especially non-violence, the libertarian milieu of the post-68 movements, and 
also the particular interests of neighbourhood associations. Carmen Magallón Portolés, a SHDFHDFWLYLVWLQ=DUDJR]DORRNVEDFNDWDQDOWHUQDWLYHFRQFHSWLRQRISROLWLFVWKDWFULWL-
cised Spains mainstream parties: »It seemed to us they were professionals in politics. In 
contrast, we wanted a policy to emerge based on our lives and, starting from our own ex-
periences, we wanted to carry out a critique of the system in favour of freedom of expres-
sion«.113
Magallón Portolés continues by laying out the »anti-political« motivations of her Col-
lective for Peace and Disarmament:
»We started to discuss the issue of peace with the people. People who had been disappointed by the 
Communist Party or revolutionary organizations. Precisely because of this disappointment, we de-FLGHGWKDWWKH&ROOHFWLYHZDVIRULQGLYLGXDOVDQGRXWVLGHSDUW\LQÁXHQFH:HGLGQRWFRQVLGHUDQ\
representation other than ourselves. [] Our collective was a movement of citizens. Not of ideolo-
gy. We had already had enough with this in the past«.114
110 Manolo Revuelta, El Estado Felipista. Una democracia policial a la sombra de la OTAN, in: =RQD&HURQRS
111 Donatella della Porta, Movimenti collettivi e sistema politico in Italia, Bari 1996, p. 114.
112 Dossier »Sobre nuestra relación con el movimiento por la paz« by Javier A. Dorronsoro, 27 0D\$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
113 Interview by Giulia Quaggio with Carmen Magallón Portolés, Madrid, May 2017.
114 Ibid.
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The relationship of the peace movement with the Spanish left-wing parties was confron-
tational but also based on mutual solidarity. The peace movement required support to pro-
mote the peace issue in Parliament, and without party support this would be virtually im-
possible. From 1981, almost every left-wing party began seeking its own branch in the 
peace and anti-NATO movement in order to win over public opinion.
From 1981, after an initial total lack of interest in the issue of Euromissiles and nu clear 
disarmament, the PCE became progressively more active on the issue of peace and Span-
ish withdrawal from NATO, in an attempt to regain public support after the poor election 
results during the transition. Following the Italian Eurocommunist strategy, the party also 
aimed to demonstrate that it was taking up the centre ground between the two Cold War 
blocs. In the partys journal, »Nuestra Bandera« (»Our Flag«), the political motives be-
hind its support for peace mobilisation were made clear:
»[I]t forms part of the Eurocommunist strategy for social transformation []. The objectives of the SDFLÀVWPRYHPHQWWKDWLVFXUUHQWO\GHYHORSLQJLQ(XURSHDUHFRQYHUJLQJ>«@ZLWKWKH3&(·VSROL-
cy []. It is good to coordinate citizens for peace and disarmament. They should be organised, and 
this should form the basis of society, not superstructures or intermediate bureaucracies«.115
Increasingly, PCE militants began working intensively in local peace grassroots groups, 
as they had already done in neighbourhood associations during the latter years of Franco-
ism.116 They also began to organise summer festivals in the name of nuclear disarmament 
in an effort to gain public support and, therefore, votes. The aim of the party secretary 
Gerardo Iglesias was to create a pioneering ensemble of left-wing grassroots groups and PRYHPHQWVWRÀJKWWKH362(ZKLFKRQFHLQJRYHUQPHQWUHYHUVHGLWVVWDQFHRQ1$72
and supported Spains continued membership. Therefore, the peace movement primarily 
served as a tool to help overcome the Spanish Communist Partys low ratings.
Similarly, the splinter parties on the left of the PCE, such as MC and LCR, aimed to uti-
lise local peace groups to promote their own message within Spanish society. The mili-
tants of these parties formed a minority within Spanish anti-NATO committees, but they 
were very active in their attempt to win more members. For example, regarding the Col-
lective for Peace and Disarmament, a report by the MC explained:
ª7KHÀUVWLQLWLDWLYH>RIWKHFROOHFWLYHRI=DUDJR]D@>«@ZDVVDLGWRKDYHDEURDGVRFLDOEDVHDQGIRU
this reason, prevented political parties from participating. [] We and the other parties could not VWRSWKLVEHLQJDYHU\ODUJHFROOHFWLYHDQGWKHPDMRULW\RIPHPEHUVKDYLQJQRSDUW\DIÀOLDWLRQV
The issue then evolved because, at times, the Collective asked political parties for money and the 
explicit support of their militants. Other times, they asked the parties not to appear in public initia-
tives or face criticism«.117
Such inherent contradictions in the relationship between parties and peace committees were QRWFRQÀQHGWRWKH3&(RUUDGLFDOOHIWRUJDQLVDWLRQVEXWZHUHDOVRDSSDUHQWZLWKLQWKH6R-
cialist Party. After the demonstration of 15 November 1981, the PSOE gave life to »its« 
peace movement, the Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Liberty (»Movimiento por 
la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad«, MPDL).118 The organisations activities continued de-
115 Francisco Herrera(OPRYLPLHQWRSDFLÀVWDHXURSHRLQ1XHVWUD%DQGHUDSS²
59, p. 59.
116 Cf. Juan Andrade, El PCE y el PSOE en (la) transición. La evolución ideológica de la izquier-
da durante el proceso de cambio político, Madrid 2015, p. 72.
117 'RVVLHUª'HODRUJDQL]DFLyQGHO0&HQ=DUDJR]D©-XQH$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
118 The founders of the MPDL were above all Socialist politicians and former Communist mili-
tants, intellectuals, and university professors. Cf. the MPDL Bulletin, Boletín Informativo Men-
sual n. 1, 1983, AFPI. On the history of MPDL, see: Dossier of the MPDL Directive Board, 
February 1982March 1985, PSOE Secretary of Citizen Participation, B. 125-G, Folder Y, doc. 2.
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spite the subsequent pro-Atlantic stance of the socialist government. The PSOEs strate-
gic goal was, in fact, to demonstrate to Spanish citizens its interest in the issues of peace 
and European security, and from an alternative perspective to that of anti-government peace JURXSV7KH362(VDZLWDVDTXHVWLRQRISURPRWLQJDSDFLÀVPWKDWVRXJKWWRVWUHQJWKHQ
multilateral disarmament (not unilateral positions), domestic security within the Euro pean 
Community, and diplomatic contacts beyond the Iron Curtain, while the sensitive issue of 
NATO was left purposely aside. However, an internal dossier revealed that the PSOE was QRWVDWLVÀHGZLWKWKHUHVXOWVREWDLQHGE\LWVPRYHPHQWIURPDVRFLDOYLHZSRLQWª5HJDUG-LQJWKH03'/LWLVLPSRUWDQWWRSRLQWRXWDLWVEDGUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHSDFLÀVWPRYHPHQW
as a whole [], b) its internal situation is not favourable to the overall strategy of the PSOE, 
c) its attempt to develop campaigns beyond CEOP goes no further than press releases and 
good intentions«.119
Ultimately, the key objective of the grassroots peace groups was to occupy a social are-
na that would overcome the limits of formal leadership in terms of individual autonomy, 
responsibility and the heterogeneity of its contributors. Their greatest fear was co-opta-
tion by the old left. In summary, they tried to avoid the politics of professional politicians 
but also the personalities of the new left. As a result, the parties themselves were forced 
to become more open and negotiate with these movements. Most importantly, there were 
major repercussions in terms of democracy and political culture within the same party or-JDQLVDWLRQVRIWKH6SDQLVKOHIWWKDWVWLOOIRFXVHGODUJHO\RQFODVVFRQÁLFW
This was the case with the MC and LCR, the only two parties that survived the decline 
of the Spanish revolutionary left at the beginning of the 1980s. They came from a strong GRFWULQDODQGKHWHURGR[0DU[LVWWUDGLWLRQZKLFKRSSRVHGZKDWWKH\GHÀQHGDVªERXUJHRLV
democracy«. The direct contact between anti-violence activists, environmental and femi-
nist groups within the peace committees led to important changes in the groups actions 
and ideological orientations. Regarding the MCs militants, »action for peace meetings« 
were set up. These were arenas for debate where militants could freely express their opin-
ions.120 Self-criticism became an essential ingredient of these meetings, as revealed in the 
dossiers. Similarly, during a 1983 meeting of its central committee addressing the ques-
tion of the anti-war movement, a spokesperson for the LCR explained: »It is necessary for 
the party to change the way it intervenes on this issue []. We want to build the widest- 
ranging movement possible«.121 The argument that mobilisation for peace should acquire 
a mass dimension relied upon the coexistence of different political traditions, from grass-
roots Christian groups to the radical left. This was an attempt to break though the ideologi-FDOPRXOGVWKDWKDGVKDSHGWKHOHIWLQWKHSUHYLRXVGHFDGHDQGKDGKDGDVLJQLÀFDQWLP-SDFWLQWHUPVRIGHPRFUDWLFFRGLÀFDWLRQ
During a meeting in 1984, the philosopher and peace activist Francisco Fernández Buey 
argued:
119 'RVVLHUª6tQWHVLVGHORVGDWRVPiVVLJQLÀFDWLYRVGHOPRYLPLHQWRSDFLÀVWDHQ©E
114-A, PSOE Secretary on Citizen Participation, AFPI.
120 On the revolutionary left during the Spanish transition: Cf. *RQ]DOR:LOKHOPL, Romper el con-
senso. La izquierda radical en la Transición española (19751982), Madrid 2016; Josepa Cucó 
Giner, Recuperando una memoria en la penumbra. El movimiento comunista y las transforma-
ciones de la extrema izquierda española, in: Historia y Política, 2008, no. 20, pp. 7396, here: 
pp. 7376; Consuelo Laíz Castro, La izquierda radical en España durante la transición a la de-
mocracia, PhD Thesis, Madrid 1994.
121 Internal Bulletin n. 3, »La campaña electoral del referéndum OTAN«, LCR Central Commit-WHH²)HEUXDU\'RFDYDLODEOHDW85/KWWSFGQYLHQWRVXULQIR&DSLWXOR3')V'RFSGI!>@
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»A feature [of the Spanish peace movement] that is worth highlighting is [] the autonomy of the PRYHPHQWIURPSROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIDQHZSROLWLFDOFRQÁXHQFHZLWKDQ
enormous degree of organizational relaxation []. It is not a question of the apolitical but some-
thing, I believe, in many ways new []. A radical criticism, sometimes really radical, of the tradi-
tional way of doing politics and, in contrast, a suggestion for a new way of doing politics, in which 
morality and ethics return to the political fold«.122
In fact, in Spain, questions over nuclear war brought about important changes in the po-
litical currents that preserved the classical Marxist conception of war as a means to revo-
lutionary change. It generated new critiques and independent perspectives on the function 
traditionally attributed to violence and the labour movement.123 For instance, during the ÀUVWKDOIRIWKHVWKHMRXUQDOª0LHQWUDV7DQWR©UHÁHFWHGH[WHQVLYHO\RQWKHUHFRQVLG-HUDWLRQRIHPDQFLSDWRU\FRPPXQLVWWKRXJKWLQWKHOLJKWRIFULWLFLVPIURPSDFLÀVWIHPL-
nist and environmental groups.124 At the same time, peace protests gave greater visibility 
to the »Izquierda Socialista« (Socialist Left) political tendency within the PSOE, with the 
consequent opening up of a tense debate on the partys internal democracy and Felipe 
Gonzálezs increasingly centralised leadership and its exclusion of dissenting voices.125
The real issue was, then, whether to convert the peace movement into a political party 
in order to have a direct impact on the Spanish representative system. There were some 
organisational attempts in this direction. For example, during the 1982 election campaign, 
the CAO, together with the Environmental Coordination and the Womens District Coor-
dination, created an »alternative platform« in Madrid. Its »aim was not to take part in the 
election campaign (an issue about which we have been quite clear), but to make possible DQHZXQLÀHGVSDFHEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWVRFLDOVHFWRUVDQGWRPDNHWKHLUGLVWLQFWYRLFHVKHDUG
through street protests«.126
Nevertheless, the PCE tried to change its electoral strategy by attempting to incorpo-UDWHWKHGHPDQGVIRUSDFLÀVPGLUHFWO\LQWRWKHWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLDOLVWDJHQGD$IHZPRQWKV
before the elections of June 1986, »Izquierda Unida« (United Left) was born with the pur-
pose of bringing to parliament the new demands of social protest, together with the tradi-
tional issues of the workers movement.127 The election result was disheartening: the new SDUW\RQO\UHFHLYHGRIWKHRYHUDOOYRWH7KLVVKRZHGWKDWDOWKRXJK6SDQLVKVRFLDO
movements could be mobilised at street level out of a spontaneous urgent need to improve VSHFLÀFPDWHULDOFRQGLWLRQVWKLVGLGQRWFRQYHUWLQWRYRWHVDWWKHEDOORWER[
V. CONCLUSION: PEACE AS A DEMOCRACY OF DISTRUST TOWARDS THE POLITICAL ELITES
The rise of a democracy, according to Pierre Rosanvallon, entails both a promise and a SUREOHPIRUVRFLHW\ªDSURPLVHLQVRIDUDVGHPRFUDF\UHÁHFWHGWKHQHHGVRIVRFLHWLHV
founded on the dual imperative of equality and autonomy; and a problem, insofar as these 
122 3DSHUE\)UDQFLVFR)HUQiQGH]%XH\/RJURxR)HEUXDU\$0&XQFODVVLÀHG
123 Jaime Pastor Verdú, La evolución del Marxismo ante la guerra y la paz, Madrid 1989, pp. 380
410.
124 »Mientras Tanto« is a journal founded by the former Communists Manuel Sacristán and  Giulia $GLQROÀLQLQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH&DWDODQ&RPPXQLVW3DUW\&IEnric Prat, Trayectorias y HIHFWRVGHOPRYLPLHQWRSDFLÀVWDLQ0LHQWUDV7DQWRQR²SS²
125 Cf. Guillermo León Caceres, El ruido y la furia. Izquierda Socialista y el referéndum sobre la 
OTAN (19841986), in: Ayer, 2016, no. 103, pp. 97122.
126 /D&$2HQODFDEH]DGHOPRYLPLHQWRSRUODSD]LQ=RQD&HURQRS
127 On the relation between the PCE and the peace movement regarding the fundaments of Unit-
ed Left, cf. Carme Molinero / Pere Ysàs, De la hegemonía a la autodestrucción. El Partido Co-
munista de España (19561982), Barcelona 2017.
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noble ideals were a long way from being realized«.128 In Spain, peace groups were a di-UHFWH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHGHPRFUDWLFUHFRQÀJXUDWLRQDQGVRFLDOGLVWUXVWIROORZLQJWKHHOLWHV·
political management of the transition. Periods of great social change such as the democ-
ratisation of Spain after Franco usually result in heightened suspicion towards authority.129 $QWL1$72JURXSVH[HPSOLÀHGVXFKGRPHVWLFVXVSLFLRQZKLFKLQFUHDVHGGXHWRZRUVHQ-
ing relations between the superpowers and the nuclear threat. Interpreting the narratives 
of this movement can contribute to moving beyond a traditional linear history of democ-
racy and put Spanish democratic disenchantment in a new light.
It is still not possible to trace social apathy during the consolidation period of Spanish 
democracy. Indeed, the peace movements breakthrough contributes to questioning the 
idea of a »Mediterranean syndrome«130, the widespread conviction that civil society was 
extremely weak in Southern Europe, a territory consequently unsuited to social mobilisa-WLRQ7KHVWXG\RISHDFHPRELOLVDWLRQFRXOGEHEHQHÀFLDOWRJDLQDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKLV
still unexplored part of Spanish society and its relation with democratic institutions. How-
ever, this should not be seen in terms of the depoliticisation of and decline in citizen ac-
tivity but as the beginning of a process of reconceptualisation of the political and the bounda-
ries of democracy. Framing ideas and perceptions on democracy of the Spanish peace groups 
effectively demonstrates the ambiguity of the relationship.'XULQJWKHÀUVWKDOIRIWKHVPHPEHUVRIWKHDQWL)UDQFRPRYHPHQWZKRKDGOLYHG
most of their lives under dictatorship, together with young people who did not really know 
what liberal democracy involved  except for some occasional contacts with their Euro-
pean contemporaries , took to the streets in support of neutrality and to protest against 
Spains entry into NATO. Moreover, during these large-scale protests, citizens from dif-
ferent cultural milieus (libertarian, Marxist and Catholic) shared views on and discussed 
an alternative model of democracy.
This model differed deliberately from the Western framework of democracy  both from 
the newly established liberal system of a parliamentary monarchy and from the revolution-
ary democracy that many activists had supported during the previous decade. The unity of 
these ideologically diverse groups would have been unimaginable during the  struggle against 
the dictatorship: the path to unity was made possible by their rejecting both the highly 
 ideologised early years of the transition and the political partisanship of social protest.
A common assumption was that US democracy was not a good example for a country VXFKDV6SDLQWRIROORZZKLFKKDGH[SHULHQFHGDGLIÀFXOWKLVWRU\LQWHUPVRIGHPRFUDF\
and held a peripheral position in the bipolar order. According to the rampant anti-Ameri-
canism of many peace protesters, the USAs democratic model represented a regulatory 
and controlling democracy. Consequently, in their minds, Spains new democracy had ac-
quired the same status due to its alliance with NATO.
In protesting against war and NATO, the Spanish peace movement practiced a dif ferent 
form of democracy in terms of participation, decentralisation and inclusion of societal ac-
tors, particularly those that had been excluded in the transition process, such as women 
128 Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust, Cambridge 2008, p. 2.
129 Ulrich Beck has also connected this distrust to technological change in modernity. Cf. Ulrich 
Beck5LVN6RFLHW\7RZDUGVD1HZ0RGHUQLW\1HZ'HOKLÀUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ*HUPDQ
1986).
130 On the concept of »Mediterranean Syndrome« see: Antonio La Spina / Giuseppe Sciortino, Com-
mon Agenda, Southern Rules: European Integration and Environmental Change in the Medi-
terranean States, in: Duncan Liefferink / Philip Lowe / Arthur Moll (eds.), European Integration DQG(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\/RQGRQSS²6HHDOVRWKHUHÁHFWLRQVLQJohn Kara-
michas (ed.), New and Alternative Movements in Spain. The Left, Identity and Globalizing 
Processes, Abingdon / New York 2014.
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and conscientious objectors. The weakness of the Spanish peace movement  much like 
other European peace groups  to change the outcome of the countrys security policy does 
not negate the importance this movement had in negotiating alternative concepts of de-
mocracy and practicing them in everyday life.131 The peace activists strove for a direct par-
ticipatory democracy as a response to the perceived limitations of the transition regimes 
accountability. Spanish anti-NATO groups represented not only a campaign against nu-
clear weapons and for unilateral disarmament but, above all, a more generalised critique 
of the new democratic reality and social life after the negotiated transition.
In the minds of these groups, the quality of democracy could only be improved by citi-
zen participation in local decision-making in contrast to what was perceived to be a  sterile 
electoral democracy. Peace in Spain was directly associated with the ideal of forging a de-
mocracy from the bottom up, and its roots were established in the civic mobilisation of 
the neighbourhood movement in the early years of the transition. In contrast to literature WKDWKDVQRWHGDGHHSFULVLVLQQHLJKERXUKRRGSROLF\GXULQJWKHÀUVWKDOIRIWKHV
peace committees were extremely successful in re-activating these local networks.132 Span-
ish peace groups envisioned another way of participating in Spanish political life and in-ÁXHQFLQJRSLQLRQWKURXJKWKHQHZSDUWLDOO\RUJDQLVHGVWUXFWXUHVRIWKHJUDVVURRWVFRP-
mittees and central peace-coordinating bodies. In these meetings, deliberation was central, 
any form of delegation was to be avoided133 and direct democracy in the form of symbol-
ic referenda was promoted.
As we have demonstrated on the basis of the available primary sources, during these 
long talks, participants tried to reach agreement on Spains position within the bipolar or-
der, the issue of nuclear weapons and, more generally, military and domestic security fol-
lowing the dictatorship. As they tried to establish common ground, they were particular-
ly fearful of addressing potentially divisive questions in depth. One of these issues was WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQYLROHQFHDQGSHDFHLHWKHSRWHQWLDOXVHDQGMXVWLÀFDWLRQRIYLR
lence for the purposes of revolutionary transformation, as in the case of Latin American 
guerrillas. In contrast with the social movements of the 1960s, Spanish peace groups were ZDU\RIGHDOLQJZLWKKLJKO\FRQÁLFWLYHLVVXHVDQGLQRUGHUWRDWWUDFWZLGHUVXSSRUWSUH-
ferred to keep to the common, generic topics of war and neutralism. Ultimately, they want-
ed to showcase viable alternatives to state control. Thus, they marked a decisive break 
with the Franco dictatorship, in which the state had permeated all areas of social life. But 
the peace movement also wanted to retain its autonomy against the recently legalised and 
still developing political parties.
131 Benjamin Ziemann, Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. Intro-
duction, in: id. (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold 
War, Essen 2008, pp. 1140, here: pp. 17 f.
132 0RVWRIWKHKLVWRULRJUDSK\RQWKH6SDQLVKQHLJKERXUKRRGPRYHPHQWKDVLGHQWLÀHGDSHULRGRIFULVLVLQWKHVRFLDODFWLYLW\RIWKLVPRYHPHQWDIWHUWKHÀUVWORFDOHOHFWLRQVLQ6SDLQLQDQG
the absorption of a part of their activities in left-wing parties or in local administrations. Cf. 
Anna Alabart, El moviment associatiu veïnal quaranta anys després: un balance, in: Revista 
Nous Horizons, 2009, no. 195, pp. 3441.
133 »A movement that aspires to represent a social majority cannot close the doors of its national 
coordinating organisation to anyone, to any collective, however small or extravagant it may 
seem; but it would be its death [] if it did not aspire to reach agreements [] to learn from RWKHUH[SHULHQFHVWROLVWHQWRRWKHUDUJXPHQWV©&I'RVVLHU&$2ª5HÁH[LRQHVSDUDHOGHEDWHGHOD&RRUGLQDGRUD(VWDWDOGH2UJDQL]DFLRQHV3DFLÀVWDVDYDQ]DUWDPELpQHQHOWHUUHQRRUJD-QL]DWLYR©0DUFK$&0XQFODVVLÀHG
